Golden Gate University School of Law

GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions

The Jesse Carter Collection

11-16-1956

Anderson v. Mart [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Family Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Anderson v. Mart [DISSENT]" (1956). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 117.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/117

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

274

ANDERSOX

19535.

v.

MART

In Bank.

[47 C.2d

Nov.

DOROTHY A. ANDEHSO:N,
MART, as Adminisi
Divorce-Permanent .<>.lJ.muu.y~-x:.u"~;~ of Agreement of Parties.
for
of the wife
and a minor
settleentered into the agreement
the
inconvenience and litigation
their
rights and
from all claims and demands
should have the care, custody
and
to the
premise of
law
could control such
only to the extent
that their agreement coincided with the order which any
court of competent jurisdiction might make for the best interest of the child, and
that the agreement
was to be a full and final settlement of the property rights
of the parties and of all claims which either might have
against the other.
[2] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Duration of Allowance-Termination.-Where provisions of a property settlement agreement
between husband and wife establish that a provision for
monthly payments for support and maintenance of the wife
and a minor child was an inseparable part of the agreement
and not a provision for alimony, and where at the time such
agreement was executed such payments did not terminate on
the husband's death or the wife's remarriage unless the agreement so provided, failure so to provide clearly indicates that
the payments should not so terminate and fortifies the conclusion that a separable
for alimony was not intended.
of Agreement of Parties.[3] !d.-Permanent
A provision in a property settlement agreement between
husband and wife that monthly payments for support of the
wife and a minor child were to be subject to court approval does
not establish that they were
and the fact that the
parties
could not by their
agreement control the court's power to make orders for the
support of their child does not conflict with their expressed
See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 217; Am.Jur.,
Divorce and Separation, § 586 et seq.
3] Divorce, § 203;
Divorce, § 214;
McK. Dig. References:
Judgments, § 115
Divorce, § 204; [7]
[4] Divorce, § 215;
§ 295.
Divorce, § 239; [8]
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should
intention that
be final and conclusive.
!d.-Permanent Alimony"-Duration of Allowance-Termination.-Provisions of a •wnn.cwtu
husband and wife that
claim
" and
ance,
hereafter contract any
rmnn.u><tu or estate of the

not assumed or otherwise
and do not
the enforcement of contractual
obligations for support and maintenance of the wife given in the
agreement in consideration of
of one spouse in the property or estate of the other
out of the marital relationship, and hence do not preclude application of the rule
that payments agreed to as an inseparable part of the property
settlement do not terminate on the husband's death.
Judgments-Relief Granted.-The
purpose of Code
Civ. Proc., § 580, declaring that relief granted to plaintiff,
if there be no answer, cannot exceed that which he shall have
demanded in his complaint, is to insure adequate notice to
defendant of the demands made on him.
Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Pleading.-Whcre plaintiff, in
her complaint for divorce, alleged that there was no community
property, "a property settlPment agreement having been
entered into between the parties," where defendant, who admitted this allegation, was aware of the terms of the agreement and knew that it provided for a designated monthly
payment for support of plaintiff and a child subject to court
approval, and where the complaint contained no allegation
attacking the validity of the agreement and plaintiff prayed for
an order for payment of precisely the sums agreed to therein,
defendant had adequate notice that the award sought was that
provided for in the agreement, and the reasonable interpretation of such complaint was that plaintiff was not abandoning
the contract but was seeking the support provided therein.
!d.-Enforcement of Awards.-Where a divorced wife, in her
action against the administratrix of the former husband's
estate to enforce her claim to support money, did not secure,
and under the divorce decree could not secure, anything to
which she was not entitled under a property settlement agreement, defendant could raise no valid objection to its enforcement as a contract obligation.

[47 C.2d
of

the
the child's
nttTibntable to
and
allocation the

Children~Orders

Subsequent to Decree.~
for support of the
settlement
cannot he reduced during

amount of
to pay the amount
hut
the rhild'~
terminatt>s on his reaching
when tlw decref; is silent on the question of
trial eourt mny detPnnine the allocation in

APPEAL from a
Costa
directions.

;Judge.

Court of Contra
Heversed with

Action by a divorced wife
administratrix of former
husband's estate to enforce her claim to support money.
Judgment for plaintiff reversed with directions.
Johnson & Harmon and Robert II. Johnson for Appellant.
Pasquinelli, O'Connor & Panelli and Timothy A. O'Connor
for Respondent.
'l'RA YNOR, J.-On March 12, 1948, plaintiff Dorothy A.
Anderson and decedent ·william E. Anderson executed a property settlement agreement. On June 22, 1948, plaintiff filed
an action against decedent for divorce. In her complaint she
alleged jurisdictional
extreme cruelty, her fitness for
child custody, and that she ''does not have sufficient money,
means or property with which to support and maintain herself and the minor child of the parties hereto, and that the
sum of $60.00 per month is a reasonable and necessary sum
to be allowed said plaintiff as and for the support and maintenance of said plaintiff and the minor child of the parties
hereto.'' She alleged that ''there is no community property
. . . , a property settlement having been entered into by and
between the parties." She prayed for a dissolution of the
marriage, for custody of the child, and that "the defendant
be required to pay to plaintiff the sum of $60 per month as
and for the support and maintenance of said plaintiff and the
minor child'' and ''for such other and further relief as the
court deems meet and proper." 'l'here was no request that
the court approve the agreement or incorporate it in its
decree.
The decedent filed an answer in propria persona admitting
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all
the allegation of extreme
and
the allegations with respect to support. He made no further
appearance in the action, and it was tried as a default action.
On July 26, 1948, an interlocutory decree was entered grantthe divorce, awarding
of the child to plaintiff, and
decedent to ''pay to plaintiff the sum of $60.00 per
month as and for the
and maintenance of said plaintiff and the minor child. . .. " It also decreed that the propsettlement agreement 'be, and the same is hereby apand
and the terms thereof are incorporated
herein with the same force and effect as if set forth in full
herein." Decedent did not appeal, and on October 11, 1949, a
final decree of divorce was entered, incorporating the terms of
the interlocutory decree. Decedent remarried, and his widow,
Mandie 0. Mart, who remarried after his death, is the administratrix herein.
On September 24, 1951, plaintiff and her attorney signed
and delivered to decedent a stipulation entitled in the court
and cause and providing that the interlocutory and final decrees ''may be modified so as to provide that the defendant
pay to plaintiff the sum of Fifty Dollars ($50.00) a month
as and for the support and maintenance of plaintiff and the
minor child of the parties hereto, and that the above-entitled
court may cause to be made and entered herein its order so
modifying said decrees.'' The stipulation was not filed, and
the decrees were not modified, but thereafter decedent paid
plaintiff only $50 per month. On April 5, 1952, decedent died.
Plaintiff presented to the administratrix of his estate a claim
for $60 per month for her life expectancy. The claim was
rejected, and plaintiff brought this action.
The trial court found that the estate was indebted to
plaintiff on the property settlement agreement and that the
agreement was incorporated in and made a part of the decree
in the divorce action and that the provision for support therein
was an inseparable part of an integrated property settlement
agreement and therefore entered judgment for plaintiff for
$14,190 to be paid out of the funds of the estate in due course
of administration. That sum was fixed by the court as the present value of $50 per month for plaintiff's life expectancy. Defendant administratrix appeals.
In their agreement plaintiff and decedent provided:
"WHEREAS, there is one (1) child the issue of said marriage
of the parties hereto . . . ; and,
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hereto desire to avoid expense,
with respect to the settleand obligations
in consideration of the premises, and
in consideration of the mutual promises and undertakings
hereinafter set
to be legally bound, the
hereto do
as follows:
released and ab"FIRsT: That .
solved from any and all
demands of the other,
including all claims of either party upon the other party for
support and maintenm1ee as hnsband and wife, or otherwise,
it being understood that this instrument is intended to settle
the rights of the
hereto in all respects, except as hereinafter provided . . . .
''SECOND : That any and all property acquired by either
party from and after the date hereof shall be the sole and
separate property of the party acquiring the same; and each
party does hereby grant to the other party all sueh future
acquisitions of property as the sole and separate property
of the party acquiring the same.
"'l'HIRD: 'l'hat each party shall have the immediate right to
dispose of or bequeath
·will his or her interests in and to
any and all property belonging to him or her from and after
the date hereof, and said right shall extend to all of the aforesaid future
of
as well as to all property
set over to either party under this agreement.
'' FoUR'rrr: That eaeh
does hereby waive and quitclaim
any right to share in the estate of the other party, either
under a \Vill or by the laws of
or by family allowance, or otherwise.
"Pn"rH: That each
does hereby accept the provisions
herein mane for him or for her in full satisfaction of his
or her right to the community property of the parties, or
other property acquired after marriage by either party, and
in full satisfaction of his or her right, if any, to alimony or
support ana maintcnanee. Neither party shall at any time
hereafter contraet any
or liability against the
property or estate of the other party, and, in the event either
party shaH do so, he or she will save the other party harmless
and free from loss occasioned by sueh act.'
Provisions were then made for the division of the property.
Bank rleposits amounting to $5,726.87 and United States
'War Savings bonds having an approximate maturity value
of $2,500 were diviilerl equally rlecerlent received the better
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: "H is understood and recognized
hereto that
can control the
of the
minor child of the
hereto
the extent that their
coincides >Yith the order which any Court of commay make for
best interest of said
to such
of
the parties
hereto agree that the "Wife shall have the care,
and
control of the minor child, with reasonable right of visitation
vested in Husband."
Paragraph 16 provided: "Subject to approval by any Court
of competent jurisdiction, Husband agrees to pay to Wife
the sum of Sixty ($60.00) Dollars per month as and for the
support and maintenance of Wife and the minor child of the
hereto, commencing forthwith and continuing in a
like sum each and every month thereafter_"
Paragraph 18 provided in part: " . . . this agreement is
intended to be, and is, a full, final and eomplete settlement
of the property rights of the parties hereto and of all elaims
which either party has or might claim to have had against the
other, were it not for this agreement. . . . ''
Paragraph 19 provided: ''This agreement can be modified,
cancelled, or rescinded only by a written agreement for that
purpose, executed by the parties hereto . . . . "
[1] In Messenger v. JJtessengM", 46 Cal.2d 619, 628 [297
P.2d 988], we held that when "the parties have clearly expressed their 'purpose of fixing and adjusting their personal
and property rights,' have provided that the provision for
alimony is 'for and in consideration of the permanent and
lasting division and settlement of all their property rights of
every kind and nature,' and the wife has waived 'all right to
future maintenance and support . . . , except as herein otherwise expressly provided,' the conclusion is inescapable that
they have made the provisions for support and maintenance
an integral and inseparable part of their property settlement
agreement. With such conclusive evidence of integration,
the provisions for support and maintenance or alimony would
be subject to modification only if the parties expressly so
provided." It is abundantly clear from the second whereas
clause, the now therefore clause, and the first, fifth, and

C.2d
within the
however, that the
agreement to
for the termination of the payments
on the death of decedent or
of plaintiff and the
provision that the payments were to be subject to the approval
of the
the conelusion that the provision for
monthly
was for
Accordingly, she concludes that it could be modified
the court and that the
obligation it
terminated on decedent's death. If it
from other
that separable alimony payments were intended, the omission of termination dates could
be explained, as defendant
on the theory that the
payments would terminate on the death of decedent (see
Miller v. Snperio1· Omwt, 9 Cal.2d 733, 737 [72 P.2d 868] ;
Roberts v. Higgins, 122 Cal.App. 170, 171 [9 P.2d 517]) or
remarriage of plaintiff.
Civ. Code, § 139.) The other
provisions of the agreement established, however, that the provision for monthly payments was an inseparable part of the
property settlement and not a provision for alimony, and
at the time the agreement was executed* such payments did
not terminate on the death of the husband or the remarriage
of the wife unless the agreement so provided. (Parker v.
Parker, 193 Cal. 478, 480-481 [225 P. 447] ; Lane v. Bradley,
124 Cal.App.2cl 661, 665 [268 P.2cl 1092] ; Anthony v.
Anthony, 94 Cal.App.2cl 507, 511 [211 P.2d 3311 ; Hamilton
v. Hamilton, 94 Ca1.App.2d 293, 300 [210 P.2cl 750] ; Estate
of Mesmer, 94 Cal.App.
103 [270 P. 732] ; see Miller v.
Superior Oonrt, supra, 9 Cal.2d 733, 737; Pearman v. Pearman, 104 Cal.App.2d 250, 255 [231 P.2cl 101] ; Gosnell v.
Webb, 66 Cal.App.2d 518, 521 [152 P.2d 463].) Under these
circumstances the failure so to provide clearly indicates that
the payments should not so terminate and fortifies the conclusion that a separable provision for alimony was not intended.
[3] The contention that the provision that the payments
were to be subject to the approval of the court establishes that
*In 1951 section 139 was amended to provide in part that "Except
as otherwise agreed by the parties in writing, the obligation of any party
in any decree, judgment or order for the support and maintenance of
the other party shall terminate upon the death of the obligor or upon
the remarriage of the other party." Since the agreement in this case
was executed, and the decree entered, in 1948, the effect of the 1951
amendment on the interpretation of similar agreements and decrees made
after its enactment is not before us.
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their
control the court power
make orders for the
support of their child in no way conflicts with their
intention that as between themselves their agreement should be flnal and eonclusiYe.
Puckett
21 Ca1.2d
842-843
r .2d 1] . ) That this was
their understanding is further indic;ated
the fact that
when a modification was desired
decedent
to
plaintiff, it was negotiated pnrsnaut to
19,
which provided that the agreement coulcl
be modified "
a written agreement for that purpose."
[4] It is contended that tlw
111 the fourth paragraph that "each part;- does
wain~ am1 q11itelaim ally
right to share in the estate of the other
, Pither under
a \Yill or by the la1v-s of snceession. or b,v
allowarJc:e,
or otherwise," and the provision of the fifth paragraph that
"Neither party shall at any time l1
coutract any debt,
eharge, or liabilit,\T against the property or estate of the other
party, and, in the eyent either party shall do so, he or she
will save the other par·ty harmless and free from loss occasioned
by such act" establish that the pa:vments >Yere to terminate on
decedent's death. (Emphasis added.) It is obvions that the
quoted provision of the fifth paragraph is irrelcYant in tlti,;;
respect since it refers to any debt, charge>, or liability to be
contracted hereaftrr and not to the obligations a"snmrd in the
agreement itself. It is an obligation assunwd in the agreement itself that plaintiff is now
to enforcr. It is
also obvious that the fonrt11 paragranh refers only to an_\T
rights to share in tl1e estate not otherwise providr•d for in
the agreement. It is similar in its broac1 language to the
proYisions of the second and third paragraphs in which each
of the parties waived all rights in any of thr
assigned
to the other and any property to be thereafter arqnired by
the other. 'l'aken together these proyisious makf: elear that
neither party should have any rig:llts in the property or the
estate of the other growing nut of tlw marital relationship.
The agrerment was ~'Xrr·u1(•(1 io sf'itl<> and
of ihose
rights in cxehangn fol' thosf' provide<l in tho
all('!

of a
husband.
Defendant contends that the
did not
the
settlement
in issue and
that since plaintiff did not pray for any relief with
to
, the court had no power to approve the prop0rty
settlement
and
it into its rlrcrPe. (See
Burtnett v. King, 33 Ca1.2d 805 [205 P.2d 657, 12 A.L.R.2d
333] .)
Code of Civil Procedure, section 580, provides: "The relief
granted to the plaintiff, if thrre be no answer, cannot exceed
that which he shall have demanded in his complaint; but
in any other case, the court may grant him any relief consistent with the case made by the complaint and embraced
within the issue." If under the pleadings, the allegation of
plaintiff's need for an award of $60 per month for the child's
and her support and her prayer therefor may reasonably
of the propbe interpreted as made pursuant to the
erty settlement agreement, tl1e court, in basing its award on
the agreement of the parties, did not grant relief in excess of
that demanded in the complaint or inconsistent with the case
made by the complaint and embraced within the issue.
[5] The
purpose of section 580 is to insure adequate notice to the defendant of the demands made upon him.
(Bnrtnett v. King, supra, 33 Cal.2d
811; Pac1>jic JY!ut. Life
Ins. Co. v. McConnell, 44 Cal.2d 715, 727
P.2d 636].)
[6] In the present case it is clear that decedent was given
adequate notice that the award
·was that provided
for in the agreement. In her complaint plaintiff alleged that
there was no community
''a property settlement
agreement having been entPred into by and between the
parties." Decedent admitted this allegation, and he was
aware of the terms of the agreement. He knew that it provided for the payment of $60 per month for the support of
plaintiff and the child subject to the
of the court.

was liable under the terms
it::;elf even if the
of the
was not
into the
divorce decree. At the trial plaintiff sought and secured a
decree
to her agreement. She
has never nceeived
than the agreement proami she hac; never attempted to seeure the benefits
of an alimony award by seeking an increase in the amount
of the
Had she attempted to seeure the benefits
attacking the jurisdiction of the
of an alimony decree
court to make the sllpport award pursuant to the agreement,
she would have been
to attack the decree she proenred. (WhiUow
87 Cal.App.2d 175,
185 [196 P.2d
8(} Cal.App.2d 456, 470
P.2d 842] ;
, 18 Cal.App.2d 481,
; see 1 Witkin, California Procedure,
483-484 [ G4 P.2d
412-413.) Since plaintiff did not secnre, aucl undrr the divorce
decree could not secure, anything to which she ·was not entitled
under her agreement, defendant could raise no valid objection
to its enforcement as a eontraet obligation.
'l'he trial court fixed the amount of the ;judgment as the
value of $50 per month for plaintiff's life expectancy
of approximately 24 years. The payments were ordered, howeyer, for the snpport of both plaintiff and the minor child.
[8] Although the amount of the payments cannot be rc>dueed
the minority of the child
v. Puckett, supm,
21 Cal.2cl
843), the obligation to pay the amount thereof
attributable to the child's support terminate's on his reaching
his
and when the decree is silent on the question of
allocation, the trial court may determine the allocation in
subsequent proceedings. (Hopkins v. Hopkins, 46 Cal.2d 313,
315-316 (294 P.2d 1] ; Meek v. Meek, 51 Cal.App.2d 492, 495,

amount attributable
in accord with this
C.

and

concurred.

CAUTER,
Concurring and Dissenting.-! concur in the
result reached by the majority insofar as it holds that the
minor child should not receive support from the estate of its
deceased father except until it reaches its majority and that
the trial court should be directed to determine the amount
to be allocated to it out of the total support payments until
that time. I dissent from that part of the majority opinion
which holds that plaintiff, the first wife of the decedent, is
entitled to receive any part of the support provided for from
the estate' of the decedent.
I am of the opinion that Paragraph SIXTEENTH of the agreement is, and was intended by the parties, to be severable from
the balance of the agreement. Paragraph SIXTEENTH provides
that'' Subject to the approval by any Court of competent jurisdiction, Husband agrees to pay to \Vife the sum of Sixty
($60.00) Dollars per month as and for the support and maintenance of ·wife and the minor child of the parties hereto,
commencing forthwith and continuing in a like sum each and
every month thereafter." The property settlement division
was set forth in preceding paragraphs and provided for an
almost equal division of the community property of the parties.
'fhe provision for $60.00 per month was obviously not considered by the parties as equalizing the division of the property
and it was made expressly subject to court approval, which
the property division had not been. It seems very obvious
that this case does not fall within the rule of the Messenger
case (Messenger· v. Messenger, 46 Cal.2d 619, 628 [297 P.2d
988]) where a majority of this court held that the alimony
provision >vas clearly for and in consideration of the permanent and lasting division and settlement of all their property
rights of every kind and nature. No such provision is found
in the case at bar.
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In

~wcuvc.u.L

complaint for divorce she made the
"That there is
of the
ment
having been entered
the
and '' 'l'hat plaintiff does not have sufficient
money, means or
·with which to
herself and the minor child of the
sum of $60.00 per month is a reasonable and necessary sum
io be allowed to said plaintiff as and for the
and
maintenance of said
and said minor child of the
parties hereto." In its interlocutory decree of
the
trial court, in four separate paragraphs ordered
that plaintiff be granted a divorce; (2) that plaintiff have the custody
and control of the minor child;
that defendant pay to
plaintiff "the sum of $60.00 per month as ancl for the ·''"""·nrN·t.
and maintenance of said plainNff ancl the minm· child of the
parties hereto, said payments commencing forthwith and
continuing in a like sum on the 23rd
of each and every
month thereafter" (emphasis added) ;
that "l'r Is FuRTHER ORDERED, AnaUDGED AND DECREED that the Proprrty
Settlement Agreement made and entered into between the
parties hereto on the 12th day of March, 1948, be, and the
same is hereby approved and ratified, and the terms thereof
are incorporated herein with the same force and effect as if
set forth in full herein." It therefore clearly appears that
both the plaintiff and the court considered that the provision
for monthly payments was a separate and distinct thing from
the property settlement. The original complaint did not
pray for court approval of the property settlement agreement
and the court specifically so found in the case at bar. The
complaint set forth, merely, that there was no community
property because it had been theretofore divided between the
parties and prayed for, on the ground of
the sum of
$60 per month as support for plaintiff and the minor child.
Paragraph FoURTH reads as follows : ''That each
does
hereby waive and quitclaim any right to share in the ('state
of the other party, either tmder a Win or by the laws of
succession, or by family allowance, or otherwise." (Emphasis
added.) Paragraph FIFTH reads as follows: '' 'fhat each
party does hereby accept the provisions herein made for him
or for her in full satisfaction of his or her
to the
community property of the parties, or other property acquired
after marriage by either party, and in full satisfaction of his
or her right, if any, to alimony or support and maintenance.

on
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"""''n.r.,,. contract any
or esf(tte
the other
shall do so, he or she
loss occa-

n>"fl'Yl.~>"'tqJ

maintenance of the
was set forth in full m
divorce thus indicating that the
as well as the parties,
intended the provision as
separate and apart from
the property settlement provisions of the agreement. This
provision was therefore merged in the
(Hough v.
Hough, 26 Cal.2d 605 [160 P.2d 15]). Each party did, by
the terms of the agreement, specifically waive any and all right
to share in the estate of the
which provision is inescapable proof that the support payments were not to continue
after the death of the one obligated therefor. In the majority
opinion it is said that "It is also obvious that the fourth
paragraph refers only to any
to share in the eBtate
not otherwise provided
" (Emphasis
added.) In so holding the
is writing something into
both the agreement and decree
to the intentions of
the parties and the court. The court treated the support
provision as something
and apart from the
agreement. The property of
parties was evenly divided
and plaintiff in her complaint alleged that "there is no community property" and prayed for support for herself and
the child on the ground of need. It would appear that had
she considered the
as part of the
community property settlement agreement her complaint
would have been differently worded. In Parlcer v. Parker,
193 Cal. 478, 481 [225 P. 447], it was held that provision for
permanent alimony is founded upon the
obligation which
the law imposes upon the husband to support the
and
"that obligation comes to an end upon the death of either
spouse. So, regardless of the language used by a court in
making a provision in its decree for the payment of alimony,
that provision ceases to be effective upon the death of either
spouse. But here v;e have a provision [based upon an agreement to pay the support during the lifetime of the wife]
based upon an
of the parties, in effect a contract.

the sum and substance of the
122
170 [9 P.2d
avYarded
and rnaintenance to the
and the appelcourt held that alimony terminated on the death of either
party. 'l'he conclusion appears inescapable that the provision
for support insofar as it relates to the plaintiff terminated
upon the death of her former husband and that she has no
claim against his estate for her support after his death.
So far as the minor child of the
is concerned a
different problem is presented. 'vve held in 1'aylor v. George,
34 Cal.2d 552 [ 212 P .2d 505 J, that "In California the rule
is that the obligation of a father to support his minor child
which is fixed by divorce decree or property settlement agreedoes not cease upon the father's death, but survives as
his eRtate.
v. Burwell, 216 Cal. 608
P.2d
; Estate
200 Cal. 654 [254 P. 567];
Estate of Caldwell, 129 Oal.App. 613 [19 P.2d 9].)" In the
i'-Jewman case supra, the decree had provided that the father
P<1Y a certain sum monthly to plaintiff for the support of the
minor child of the parties "until further order of court."
This court held that such an obligation continued after the
death of the father and during the minority of the child. "And
rightfully so, for it is the solemn duty of every father to
snpport his children during their minority, and if he fails
t do so, every principle of justice demands that
be thus
out of his estate." (Pp. 612·613.)
In view of the conclusion reached by me that the monthly
provision of the
and decree was intended
the court and the
to be severable from the provito property division in the agreement and not
an
part
I would reverse the judgment
with directions to the trial court to determine what portion
of the monthly payment should be allocated for the support

:!88
It follows from vvhat I have heretofore said
entitled to no
of the decedent's estate
his estate for her support should be
and her claim
disallowed.

was, or could
a mere reference.
in Plynn v. Plynn (1954), 42
P.2d 865], and my dissenting opinion
(1956), 46 Cal.2d 619, 637 [297

m
P.2d 988] .)
In addition to Justiee Carter's discussion it may be pointed
out that the provisions of the doeument entitled "Property
Settlement Agreement," whether considered alone or together
with the allegations of plaintiff's complaint for divorce and
the terms of the interlocutory and final decrees of divorce,
appear to preclude the construction placed upon the agreement by the trial court and the majority of this court. Rather,
in my view, the agreement, the complaint for divorce, the
divorce decrees, and the conduct of plaintiff and her former
husband combine to demonstrate that the monthly payments
were intended to be for alimony to the wife and support of
the child, and the contrary determination of the trial court
herein as to the alimony payments is untenable.
The complaint for divorce alleged ''That there is no community prope1·ty the result of said marriage of the parties
hereto, a JJroperty settlement agreement hav-ing been entered
into ... That pla~·ntiff does not have sufficient money, means
or property with which to st<pport and maintain herself and
the minor child of the parties hereto, and that . . . $60.00
per month is a reasonable and necessary sum . . . for the
support and maintenance of said plaintiff and said minor
child." (Italics added.) The complaint prayed for "$60.00,
per month, for the sttppm·t and maintenance of plaintiff and
said minor child." (Italics added.) This is far from being
a prayer for an order directing specific performance of a
property settlement agreement, and following such prayer, the
interlocutory decree ordered the husband to pay $60 a month
''for the snpport and maintenance of said plaintiff and the
minor child,'' not as specific performance of a property settlement agreement. (Italics added.)
The above quoted allegations of the complaint for divorce
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are m accord with
the
16) that"Subject
to the approval by any Court of competent jurisdiction,
Husband agrees to pay to Wife ... [$60] per month as and
for the suppod and maintenance of \Vife and the minor
child.'' (Italics added.) The general
of para1, 5, and
quoted in the majority opinion
278,
of paragraph
do not overcome the specific
as to support.
Plaintiff's
in the divorce action that "there is no
community property . ., a property settlement agreement
been entered into,'' and that ''plaintiff does not have
snffieient money, means or property with which to support
. . . herself . . . , '' are highly persuasive that what plaintiff
for herself in the divorce action vms alimony, as such,
not specific enforcement of a property settlement agreement,
to which no issue was raised. If plaintiff were in fact
seeking a decree ordering performance of a property settlement agreement she could and should have sought its approval
and a decree literally incorporating it in the judgment and
ordering defendant to perform its covenants.
The conduct of plaintiff in praying in the divorce action
for support for herself and the child is consistent only with
the view that the payments provided by paragraph 16 of the
agreement were, as to plaintiff, for support, that is, alimony.
Furthermore, plaintiff's subsequent eonduct in "stipulating"
to and accepting a reduction in the amount of the payments,
although the agreement contained no provision particularly
dlrected to a change of such amount, indicates that plaintiff
as well as the former husband considered and treated the
payments as alimony and support, subject to court order
and not as a part of the division of property.
In these circumstances the rule quoted in the majority
opinion (p. 279) from Messenger v. 11Iessenge1· (1956), su~pra.,
46 Cal.2d 619, 628, can have no application. Plaintiff
did not treat the support provision of the agreement
here as an "integral and inseparable part" of the property
settlement portions of the agreement; she treated it, her
former husband treated it, and in accord with their position
the trial court in the divorce proceeding treated it, as an
agreement for support and alimony in addition to, not as an
integral part of, the settlement of their property rights.
From the foregoing conclusion that the payments decreed
47 C.2d-10
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C.2d

to make such
terminated with the death
of the former husband insofar as such payments are alimony
"''""'"'){"'' Court (1937 , 9 Cal.2d 733, 737 [72 P.2d
Parker
, 198 Cal. 478, 481 [225 P.
Hamilton (1949), 94 Cal.App.2d 293,
; Roberts v. Higgins
, 122 Cal.App.
) , although the obligation survives
insofar as the payments are child
( 1949), 34 Cal.2d 552, 556 [212
; Newman v. Burwell
, 216 Cal. 608, 612
I ·would reverse the judgment with directions consistent
with the
views.
Shenk,

concurred.

Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December
1956. Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, ,T., were of the
opinion that the petition should be granted.

A. No. 24036.
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Nov. 20, 1956.]

Estate of ISABELLA N. SKINKEH, Deceased. NANCY
SKINKEit WEDDLE, as Executrix et al., Appellants,
v. HOBERT C. KIRKWOOD, as State Controller, Respondent.
[la, lb] Taxation-Inheritance Taxation-Deductions.-The commissions of an executrix and her attorney allowed as deductions for inheritance tax purposes should be the amount of
statutory commissions in effect at the time of decedent's death,
and not the increased fees as allowed by Prob. Code, § 901,
as amended and effective at a later date.
Deduction of commissions of executors, administrators or
trustees in computing succession or estate tax, note, 92 A.L.R. 537.
See also Cal.Jur., Taxation,§ 423; Am.Jur., Inheritance, Estate and
Gift
§ 249 et seq.
McK. Dig. References:
2, 4-6] Taxation,§ 441(3); [3] Taxation, § 441(4); [7] Taxation, § 436; [8, 9] Taxation, § 437; [10]
Statutes, § 161; [11] Decedents' Estates, §§ 219, 225; [12] Decedents' Estates, § 219.

